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SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY, THE SMITH ACT,
AND PROSECUTION FOR RELIGIOUS SPEECH
ADVOCATING THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF
GOVERNMENT
JOHN ALAN COHAN
The obligation of Allah is upon us to wage Jihad for the sake of
Allah. It is one of the obligations which we must undoubtedly
fulfill ... and we conquer the lands of the infidels and we
spread Islam by calling the infidels to Allah and if they stand in
our way, then we wage Jihad for the sake ofAllah.
-Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, speaking in Detroit in 19911
INTRODUCTION
From the earliest time of civilization it has been a basic
principle of government that a nation has an inherent right to
protect its sovereignty by defending itself. Defending itself
translates into safeguarding public security, and is perhaps the
most basic function of government. It is what those who
established our Constitution had in mind in the stated purpose of
the Preamble "to insure domestic Tranquillity."2 The Preamble
to the Constitution also provides the mandate for the
Government to both "provide for the common defense" and to
secure "the blessings of liberty" by "establishing justice."3 Under
the Constitution, the function of the federal government in
providing for the common defense is to vouchsafe the safety of
the people, the security of the nation, and liberty itself. One of
the complaints about the Articles of Confederation was that there
I See Jihad io America (WNET television broadcast, Nov. 21, 1994) (demonstrating
worldwide radical Islamic conspiracy against the West).
2 United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting the U.S.
Constitution preamble).
3 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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was a need to secure the safety of the citizens of the several
states, a need which was not fulfilled.4
A sovereign government has the power to resist aggression
against enemies located abroad, as well as enemies at home. The
power to punish domestic enemies who would threaten to put
down or destroy the government has been recognized in the
common law of sedition and in modern statutes enacted to punish
subversive activities. Seditious conspiracy is a crime against the
security of the state. The charge accuses the defendant of
committing a crime against "We the people." The charge asks the
jury to decide whether the defendant is one of "us" engaging in
protected speech, or one of "them," conspiring to commit acts of
sedition against our government.
Religious sermons by religious clerics have rarely imperiled the
nation's security. While the government has occasionally
scrutinized "radical" religions with unpopular beliefs and
practices, 5 religious sects and spiritual groups have historically
not been a threat to national security. Ominously, events of the
past few years, particularly in the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, suggest that the threat posed by religious extremists
against the United States is real. According to some
commentators, most Americans believe that the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, arose from the religious zeal that seems
to be central to Islam. 6 Many think that Islam is intrinsically
incompatible with liberal democratic values and tenets, and that
it poses a serious threat to the vital interests of the West.7 After
4 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (proposing safety as a priority).
5 During the nineteenth century, the federal government considered Mormonism to be
a socially unacceptable religion, and acted to suppress its practice of polygamy. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (stating "Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and
opinions, they may with practices.").
6 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Terrorism Beyond Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at A23
(proposing that most people associate terror attacks of September 11, 2001 with Islam).
7 See Mohammed Jaafar Mahallati, Islam and the West: Challenges and
Opportunities, in UNDER SIEGE: ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 15 (Richard W. Builliet ed., The
Middle East Institute Columbia U. Occasional Papers 1994). On the question of Islam and
democracy, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, has said:
The prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this
region .... We have our own Muslim faith which is a complete system and a complete
religion. Elections do not fall within the sphere of the Muslim religion, which believes
in the consultative system .... Free elections are not suitable for our country, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
See also Gary Sick, Islam and the Norms of Democracy, in UNDER SIEGE ISLAM AND
DEMOCRACY 33 (Richard W. Builliet ed., The Middle East Institute Columbia U.
[Vol. 17:199
2003] ADVOCATING THE VIOLENTOVERTHROWOFGOVERAMENT 201
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the opinion of
many Americans focused on the mantra that "Islamic
fundamentalists, without question, are one of the greatest
threats to the United States .... "8 In 1994, the documentary,
Jihad in America9 chronicled a network of Islamic extremists in
the United States bent on waging religious warfare.10 The
footage showed, among other things, a radical Islamic summer
camp in the Midwest where children were taught how to wage
violent jihad in the United States. 1
Today in the United States there is a tension between
moderate Muslims and hate-filled radicals. For some years
wealthy individuals in Saudi Arabia have funded the radical
Wahhabism sect to espouse anti-American views in mosques
within United States.12  In January, 1999, the U.S. State
Department started to take a closer look at radical preaching in
mosques after Sheik Muhammad Kabbani, head of the Islamic
Supreme Council of America, warned that "the most dangerous
thing that is going on now in these mosques is the extremist
ideology" that has taken over "80 percent of the mosques that
have been established in the U.S."3 Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, radical imans have been toning down their
rhetoric by offering such comments as "The killing of innocents is
forbidden in our religion," 4 but Muslim clerics in the United
States "are ideologically on the side of terrorists," according to
moderate Muslim Khalid Duran of the Ibn Khaldun Society, a
small international Muslim cultural group.15
Many people believe that there is, or ought to be, an absolute
privilege to criticize government and government systems, and to
associate with others for this purpose without fear of criminal
Occasional Papers 1994).
8 See Ron Martz, Experts See New Trends in Terrorism, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug.
5, 1994, at A8 (quoting comment made in 1994 by FBI counter terrorism expert Oliver
Revell).
9 See Jihad in America, supra note 1.
10 See Jihad in America, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A24 (noting Islamic
extremists waging religious warfare).
11 See Jiadin America, supra note 1 (showing radical Islamic summer camp).
12 See Jake Tapper, The Bully Pulpit, TALK MAGAZINE, Feb. 2002 at 38, 39 (noting
Saudi Arabians "have used vast reserves of petro-dollars to promote Wahhabism").
13 Id.
14 Id. at 41.
15 Id. at 39 (noting Ibn Khaldun Society is "a small international Muslim cultural
group").
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prosecution.16 But the scope of freedom of speech under the First
Amendment cannot be viewed in a vacuum, and is clearly
affected by the interplay of world events and public policy. A
delicate line can be crossed, whereby lawful criticism of
government may become seditious speech, where associating
with others in robust criticism of government may become
subversive activities punishable by law.
A dramatic example of modern day sedition involved the
indictment and conviction of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a blind
radical Islamic cleric who resided in New Jersey, and nine co-
defendants, based on a plot to wage a "war of urban terrorism"
against the United States in violation of the seditious conspiracy
statute. 7 Much of the case against Sheik Rahman, discussed in
this article, was based on evidence of subversive sermons and
religious guidance given by the cleric to members of his flock.
Except for the prosecution of Sheik Rahman and his co-
defendants, modern-day sedition trials are almost unheard of.18
Society's preoccupation with criminal anarchy during World War
I provides the most notable examples of prosecutions for
seditious speech during the Twentieth Century. There were
thousands of prosecutions for violation of sedition under the
Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918.19 A resurgence of sedition
16 "1 see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any 'clear and present
danger' test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling.. .
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454-57 (1969) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring).
17 See 18 U.S.C. §2384 (1994) (stipulating that any two or more people who conspire
to overthrow or harm U.S. Government will be subject to seditious conspiracy statute); see
also United States v. Rahman, 854 F.Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining purpose
and effect of seditious conspiracy statute as noted in paragraph nine of Rahman
Indictment).
18 See Jeff Barge, Sedition Prosecutions Rarely Successful- Government tries to beat
the odds in trial of blind cleric's followers, 80 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (Oct. 1994) (noting that only
a few sedition prosecutions have been heard in United States within past couple of
decades); see also Thomas Church, Jr., Conspiracy Doctrine and Speech Offenses: A
Reexamination of Yates v. United States from the Perspective of United States v. Spoke,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 569, 569 (1975) (commenting that conspiracy charges are primary
mechanism in dealing with crimes in high charged political areas).
19 See M. J. HEALE, AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNISM: COMBATING THE ENEMY WITHIN,
1830-1970 (Johns Hopkins U. Press 1990) (1990) (noting large numbers of prosecutions
under Espionage Act of 1917). See generally Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 244
(1920) (affirming prosecution for seditious distribution of literature under Espionage Act
of 1917); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (noting that seditious acts
committed during war with Germany that curtailed production of ammunition is unlawful
under Espionage Act of 1917); Fohrwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919)
(holding that protections of First Amendment are not applicable to seditious acts which
prevent recruiting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919) (emphasizing that
circulating a pamphlet to discourage recruitment and enlistment into Armed Forces is a
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cases occurred immediately following World War II, with the
specter of international Communism corrupting American society
from within.20 Underlying these cases was the attitude that any
advocacy of communist ideas and opinions was inherently an
extremely dangerous incitement to overthrow the existing social
order. During the Vietnam War and the black liberation
movement of the 1960s and 1970s there were further efforts to
prosecute people for sedition in one form or another. 21
Whereas in the past, communism, syndicalism, and anarchism
were the ideological threats under which charges of sedition were
brought, today the new danger may be rooted in extremist
religious views. The government's interest in protecting national
security against the encroachment of subversive political ideas in
the 20th century may now be resurfacing in the context of
subversive religious ideas.22 Prosecutions of seditious conspiracy
are more likely to occur in a climate of society's heightened
apprehension about terrorist plots against the nation.
The use of sedition charges against clerics may be a rare
occurrence in the nation's courts, and the idea of modern-day
sedition presents intriguing philosophical, constitutional and
practical questions. If the government decides to take an
aggressive stance towards radical faiths, deploying content-based
violation of Espionage Act of 1917).
20 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 300 (1956) (noting fourteen
petitioners were indicted in 1951 as Communists trying to overthrow government);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495-97 (1951) (affirming conviction of Communist
Party members for conspiring to overthrow government); United States v. Silverman, 248
F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1957) (reversing convictions of defendants for violating Smith Act
by promoting overthrow of government).
21 The individual states of the United States deployed state sedition laws to curtail
local insurrection and riots. Brandenburg involved the Ku Klux Klan and Ohio's Criminal
Syndicalism statute for "advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime,
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45. This case involved the prosecution of individuals for
inciting a riot in Chicago and traveling interstate to achieve their goal; see also United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348-50 (7th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
Defendants were convicted of protesting against the Selective Service draft during the
Vietnam War, but the First Circuit reversed the convictions because they did not
participate in criminal conspiracy activities. See generally United States v. Spoke, 416
F.2d 165, 168-69 (1st Cir. 1969) (noting indictments based on conspiracy to interfere with
the Military Training and Services Act).
22 See Joseph Grinstein, Jihad and the Constitution: The First Amendment
Implications of Combating Relhgiously Motivated Terrorism, 105 YALE L. J. 1347, 1367
(1996) (extrapolating Supreme Court's handling of issues relating to free speech and
religious ideas along with protecting national security).
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standards to label specific sermons and speeches uttered by
clerics as "dangerous," or to prosecute clerics for spreading a
radical spiritual doctrine within a religious community, the
government can in effect outlaw certain religious sects
altogether. The rationale in doing so would be to prevent overt
acts of terrorism against the government by stopping it at the
preaching level.
Religious speech is not protected differently from other speech.
As stated by Justice Reed in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral
of Russian Orthodox Church,23 "Legislative power to punish
subversive action cannot be doubted. If such action should be
actually attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his pulpit
would be a defense." In a pretrial ruling denying Sheik
Rahman's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the
argument that the charges involved the performance of his
pastoral duties, the judge said, "[T]hat speech-even speech that
includes reference to religion-may play a part in the commission
of a crime does not insulate such crime from prosecution.
'[Sipeech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is the
very vehicle of the crime itself."'24
RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE FORM OF SERMONS AND RELIGIOUS
DIALOGUES HAS A UNIQUELY MOTIVATIONAL QUALITY
Sermons in all religions are their very nature not mere
speeches that advocate ideas in the abstract; rather, they are
designed to convince followers to take certain prescribed actions.
Generally, a cleric or priest who disseminates a religious tenet to
congregants fully intends to induce them to abide by it.
Moreover, congregants do not come to listen to these teachings
out of mere academic interest or for entertainment, but instead
to use these to motivate themselves into action.
The February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center
demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States to terrorists
with ties to radical Islamic groups.2 5 In July of 1993 the Federal
23 344 U.S. 94, 109 (1952).
24 See United States v. Rahman, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10151, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July
22, 1994) (quoting United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970)).
25 The 1993 World Trade Center bombing culminated in the prosecution and
conviction of three individuals with loose ties to Sheik Rahman and his followers. The
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Bureau of Investigation broke up the extensive terrorist plot
inspired by Sheik Rahman and his followers in New Jersey.
Sheik Rahman was prosecuted for seditious conspiracy and
convicted essentially because of the content of his sermons and
his religious advice. Members of his group, inspired by Rahman's
fiery sermons, assassinated the anti-Arab rabbi, Meir Kahan, in
November 1990 during a speech at a New York City hotel, and
plotted to blow up the United Nations headquarters, the New
York Federal Building, destroy the Lincoln and Holland tunnels,
the George Washington Bridge in New York City, and plotted to
assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was on
an official visit to the United States (a plot which was foiled),
among other offenses.26
Rahman's role in the seditious conspiracy was that he incited
his followers to undertake subversive actions by providing
encouragement to them by means of general religious advice and
the religious propriety of some of their specific plans. 27 Sheik
Rahman's sermons and constituted seditious speech in virtue of
the fact that they instructed his followers to wage violent jihad
against the United States, thereby creating an imminent danger
to the nation's security. His blindness and frailty prevented him
from carrying out specific terrorist plans with the others. In fact,
the evidence showed that Rahman did not even participate in
any actual plotting against the government or in the preparatory
activities undertaken by his co-defendants.28 Of the ten
defendants found guilty in the case, all were of the Muslim faith.
The seditious conspiracy statute can also be used, among other
laws, to prosecute extremists such as white supremacists and
other extremists for a variety of less dramatic terrorist plots. If a
radical Christian group forms a plot to "wage urban warfare" by
conspiring to bomb abortion clinics, or to conspire to put down or
destroy medical research institutes through acts of violence, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions. United
States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 1998).
26 See Robert D. McFadden, Eight Seized as Suspects in Plot to Bomb New York
Targets and KIT1 Poitical Figures, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1993, at Al (discussing capture of
suspects and various targets that bombers were planning to attack); Eleanor Randolph,
"MegatriaJ" Prompts Questions of Fairness, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1994, at A25
(mentioning numerous planned targets of attack).
27 See Grinstein, supra note 22, at 1352 (discussing Rahman's role in terrorist attack
as more inflaming others than specific planning).
28 See id.
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government could readily deploy the seditious conspiracy statute
against the conspirators. As a practical matter, seditious
conspiracy is more likely to be used when the government
believes there exists a high degree of public condemnation of the
targeted group's actions. 29
This article will focus primarily on the seditious conspiracy
statute and its modern-day application, with an analysis of the
statute as used in the Rahman case, and, as well, a discussion of
the Smith Act, the companion statute to seditious conspiracy,
which may also get dusted out as a prosecutorial weapon.
HISTORY OF THE SEDITION STATUTE
The seditious conspiracy statute30 is a rarely used criminal law
that allows defendants to be convicted simply for concocting
general plots against the government. As one commentator put
it, "seditious conspiracy deals with a crime of the mind .... [I]t
allows a conviction based on a sense that there is antipathy or
hatred. You don't have to do anything; you just have to think
it."31 It was the intent of Congress for Section 2384 "to help the
government cope with and fend off urban terrorism."32 The
interests to be protected by enforcing the statute include the
government's interest "in safeguarding public security."33
The crime of sedition dates back to Socrates. 34 Sedition has
been defined as "a commotion; the raising of a commotion, in the
state, not amounting to an insurrection; or the excitement of
discontent against the government, or of resistance to lawful
authority."35 Sedition is usually confined to words or conduct
29 See BRENT L. SMITH & AUSTIN TURK, TERRORISM IN AMERICA: PIPE BOMBS AND
PIPE DREAMS 167 (1994) (discussing low rate of convictions under sedition statutes and
government use of public opinion).
30 18 U.S.C. §2384 (1994).
31 See Kevin Fedarko, The ImaginaryApocalypse: A US. Court Finds a Blind Muslim
Cleric and Nine of His Followers Guilty of "Seditious Conspiracy" to Conduct a Bombing
Spree Throughout New York City, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995 at 46 (quoting Fordham University
Law Professor Tracy Higgins).
32 United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cr. 1986).
33 Id. (distinguishing sedition statute from treason statute, by indicating they are
rooted in different governmental interests).
34 See Bradley T. Winter, Invidious Prosecution: The History of Seditious Conspiracy
-Foreshadowing the Recent Convictions of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman and His
Immigrant Followers, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 185, 186 (1996) (conceptualizing prosecution
of 1993 World Trade Center bombers in history of sedition laws).
35 70 AM JUR. 2D Sedition, Subverse Activities, and Treason §4 (2002) (quoting
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without overt acts, while insurrection and rebellion involve overt
acts in the form of an actual uprising against the existing
organized government. 36 Black's Law Dictionary defines sedition
as:
[a]n agreement, communication, or other preliminary
activity aimed at inciting treason or some lesser commotion
against public authority; advocacy aimed at inciting or
producing-and likely to incite or produce-imminent
lawless action.... .The difference between sedition and
treason is that preliminary steps commit the former, while
the latter entails some overt act for carrying out the plan.
But of course, if the plan is merely for some small
commotion, even accomplishing the plan does not amount to
treason. 37
The definition continues by quoting the following passage from
The Book of English Law:
This, perhaps the very vaguest of all offenses known to the
Criminal Law, is defined as the speaking or writing of words
calculated to excite disaffection against the Constitution as
by law established, to procure the alteration of it by other
than lawful means, or to incite any person to commit a crime
to the disturbance of the peace, or to raise discontent or
disaffection, or to promote ill-feeling between different
classes of the community. A charge of sedition is,
historically, one of the chief means by which Government,
especially at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of
the nineteenth century, strove to put down hostile critics. It
is evident that the vagueness of the charge is a danger to the
liberty of the subject, especially if the Courts of Justice can
be induced to take a view favorable to the Government.38
Seditious conspiracy is one of a few crimes in which conspiracy
alone constitutes the offense.
The modern seditious conspiracy statute reads in full:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any
Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969)).
36 Id. (establishing basis to contrast sedition from rebellion or insurrection).
37 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (7th ed. 1999).
38 Id. (citing Edward Jenks, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 136 (P.B. Farest Ed., 6th ed.
1967)).
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place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the
Government of the United States, or to levy war against
them [sic.], or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by
force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of
the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any
property of the United States contrary to the authority
thereof, they shall each be fined not more than $20,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.39
Elements of the Offense
To support a conviction for seditious conspiracy the
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following
elements:
1. That there existed a conspiracy between two or more
persons to "levy war against" or "oppose by force the authority of'
the United States government, to overthrow the United States,
or to prevent, hinder or delay execution of any law of the United
State;
2. That the conspiracy occurred in a State or Territory, or
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
3. That the use of force was part of the conspiracy plot.
The plain language of the modern statute requires no overt act
as an element of the offense, and courts have specifically
interpreted the statute to not require an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy.40
Section 2384 does not use the word "seditious" except in the
caption to the statute, perhaps because the word "seditious" in
and of itself does not sufficiently convey what conduct it forbids.
Courts have noted that "sedition," as a term, does not define a
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness to permit ordinary
people to understand what conduct is prohibited.4 1 The text of
39 18 U.S.C. §2384 (1994).
40 See Bryant v. United States, 257 F. 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1919) (involving conspiracy
to prevent enforcement of Selective Draft Act, which established the precedent for notion
that no overt act is necessary for conviction); see also Enfield v. United States 261 F. 141,
143 (8th Cir. 1919) (identifying that section six of Espionage Act is applicable for
conspiring to oppose Selective Draft Act and thus no overt act is required).
41 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598 (1967) (noting that
"dangers fatal to First Amendment freedoms inhere in the word 'seditious,"' and declaring
invalid a law that provided for the discharge of state employees who utter "seditious
words").
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the statute is silent on the question of what sort of content
constitutes seditious speech so as violate the law and to be
stripped of the protections otherwise accorded free speech under
the First Amendment.
The constitutionality of this statute has been upheld against
attacks of vagueness. Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the terms of the statute are "far more
precise," than the common law crime of sedition, and that the
language of the statute refers to conspiracy to levy war against
the United States, or to oppose by force the authority or laws of
the United States, and its elements are sufficiently clear as to
inform society as to what makes up the offense. 42
There have been and continue to be serious criticisms of the
seditious conspiracy statute. One criticism of is this,
"Essentially seditious conspiracy deals with a crime of the mind.
... [Ilt allows a conviction based on a sense that there is
antipathy or hatred. You don't have to do anything, you just
have to think it."43 Mr. Justice Jackson once warned, "The crime
[of seditious conspiracy] comes down to us wrapped in vague but
unpleasant connotations. It sounds historical undertones of
treachery, secret plotting and violence on a scale that menaces
social stability and the security of the state itself.44
Cases of seditious conspiracy develop along common lines; the
government charges the defendants with planning to "levy war"45
against the United States and, almost invariably, the defense
invokes the First Amendment as a shield.46
42 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (narrowly
construing State of Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, similar in form and content to
seditious conspiracy); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 300 (1956) (upholding
constitutionality of the Smith Act); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1950)
(holding that speech may not be protected by First Amendment if it creates danger to
nation); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that Supreme
Court has only addressed seditious conspiracy statute in passing); see also discussion
infra at part III.C.
43 See Fedarko, supra note 31, at 46 (noting that legal experts are concerned that
people may be prosecuted for harboring inflammatory beliefs) (quoting Fordham
University Law Professor Tracy Higgins).
44 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(comparing "conspiratorial movements" with political assassinations, coup d'etats,
putsches, revolutions, and seizures of power in modern times).
45 18 U.S.C. §2384 (2002) (explaining that penalty for levying war under this section
is fine, imprisonment for up to twenty years, or both.).
46 See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 116. During the trial of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman
asserted his First Amendment rights with respect to the fiery sermons he had given
against Western imperialism; see also discussion infra at part III.E.
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Conspiracy Defined
Seditious conspiracy is a completed offense at the conspiracy
stage. A conspiracy is an agreement by two or more persons to
commit an unlawful act.47 The crime of conspiracy is completed,
and may be prosecuted, before any overt action occurs beyond the
formation of the agreement. 48 An "overt act" refers to any legal
or illegal act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Conspiracy as a
crime is thought to justify prosecution prior to an overt act
because the joint illegal intent of two or more individuals is
significantly more dangerous than a similar intent on the part of
an individual. 49
When two agree to carry [a plot] into effect, the very plot is
an act in itself .... The agreement is an advancement of the
intention which each has conceived in his mind; the mind
proceeds from a secret intention to the overt act of mutual
consultation and agreement. 50
Conspiracy is difficult to prove at trial because the crime is
"heavily mental in composition."51 "In the long category of crimes
there is none, not excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to
confine within the boundaries of definitive statement than
conspiracy."52 As a matter of substantive law, to be proven guilty
of conspiracy a defendant need not know the identity of all the
other members of the conspiracy and need not know every detail
of the conspiracy.53 It is sufficient to show that the defendant
47 See WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 453
(1972) (explaining meaning of conspiracy).
48 See Church, supra note 18 at 572 (commenting that conspiracy prosecution aims at
preventing unlawful action).
49 Id. (citing LAFAVE, supra note 47, at 459-60) (noting that only when two people's
separate intents are unified in an act of agreement are they punishable).
50 State v. Carbone, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (1952) (stating common law rule that
"conspiracy consists not merely in intention but in agreement of two or more persons...
to do unlawful acts, or to do lawful acts by unlawful means..." if such "design rests in
intention only, it is not indictable").
S1 See Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 632
(1941) (explaining that conspiracy is complete when one manifests his intention to
others).
52 Id. at 624 (explaining that conspiracy may be connected to every type of tort or
crime).
53 See United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557, (1947)) (noting that knowing other parties to conspiracy
is not required in order to be found guilty of conspiracy); see also United States v. Labat,
905 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a conspiracy charge when defendant did not
know all participants or their actions in large cocaine deal).
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simply joined in the initial illegal agreement.54 That is, once an
unlawful agreement is shown to have been made, the
Government need show only: some evidence from which it can be
reasonably inferred that the person charged with conspiracy
knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment
and knowingly joined and participated in it."55
Some commentators argue that conspiracy cases based on
speech acts alone present considerable opportunity for unfairness
to the defendants because the inquiry focuses on a morass of
highly subjective and ultimately unreliable inferences. 56
No Overt Act Required in Seditious Conspiracy
The philosophy behind allowing the charge of seditious
conspiracy absent an overt act is that the state should not be
powerless to prevent crimes that are still in their formative
stages. It has been explicitly held that the Government need not
prove an overt act in furtherance of the goal of sedition in order
to prove the crime of seditious conspiracy.5 7 In the Rahman case
the issue of proof of overt acts was expressed this way: "The
Government, possessed of evidence of conspiratorial planning,
need not wait until buildings and tunnels have been bombed and
people killed before arresting the conspirators."58 The gist of the
crime is agreement to promote the ends the law forbids.59
When seditious conspiracy is charged, the Government may
decide to allege and prove certain relevant overt acts undertaken
in furtherance of the conspiracy by one defendant or another.60
54 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "one
beneficial purpose of conspiracy law is to permit arrest and prosecution before substantive
crime has been accomplished").
55 See United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir. 1984)).
56 See Church, supra note 18, at 575 (commenting on conspiracy cases based on
speech alone as possessing considerable unfairness).
57 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (upholding conviction for
advocating overthrow of government before any overt acts were undertaken in
furtherance of goal); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1986)
(confirming that seditious conspiracy statute requires no overt act).
58 See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117 (acknowledging that seditious conspiracy statute
requires no overt act).
59 See id. at 159 (indicating that co-conspirators were all equally culpable in
conspiracy because they were willing to do whatever was necessary to effectuate plans).
60 See id. at 116, 129 (introducing evidence of overt acts such as making bombs,
contributing money to rent a "safe-house" in which to build the bombs, and other facts,
against Sheik Rahman and his co-defendants).
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Although, proof of some relevant overt action often can help
pinpoint the existence of a conspiracy, 61 and can help to show
that the conspiracy proved to come "dangerously close to
success," 62 it is not required to show that an individual defendant
personally knew of the overt acts performed by any of the other
defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy. The evidence
against Sheik Rahman showed that he was in "constant contact"
with other members of the conspiracy, that he was looked to as a
leader, and that he accepted that role and encouraged the other
defendants to engage in violent acts against the United States.63
The advisability of proving overt action in addition to speech
was strongly advised by Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion in Brandenberg v. Ohio,64 where he said that the:
line between what is permissible and not subject to control
and what may be made impermissible and subject to
regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts.
The example usually given by those who would punish
speech is the case of one who falsely shouts fire in a crowded
theatre.
This is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded
with action. . .. They are indeed inseparable and a
prosecution can be launched for the overt acts actually
caused.65
Evidence of some type of overt action will lend credence to the
prosecution's theory that seditious conspiracy occurred. The
prosecution can make a stronger case by showing overt action
undertaken in furtherance of anti-governmental goals-e.g.,
evidence that congregants took some identifiable action in
61 See United States v. Offutt, 127 F.2d 336, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (arguing that overt
act is a "manifestation that a conspiracy is at work").
62 Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) at 46 (stating that in order
for attempts or incitement to be punishable it must come "dangerously near success," and
bad intention is one factor in determining whether actual conduct is dangerous).
63 See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 124 (noting Rahman was in "constant contact" with other
members of the conspiracy).
64 395 U.S.444, 456-57 (1969)
65 Id.
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furtherance of a seditious sermon such as "the collection of
weapons and ammunition in substantial quantities, or the
conducting of field surveys to ascertain ways and means of
sabotaging public utility or defense plants."66
The presence of an overt act can help distinguish legitimate
spiritual beliefs from dangerous ones, as well as speech that calls
for concrete action as distinguished from speech that simply
evokes spiritual metaphors. In other words, if there is evidence
of overt action, the jury will be in a better position to evaluate
whether the violence spoken about passes the "clear and present
danger" test, discussed below, by genuinely calling for urban
terrorism, or whether it more likely constitutes symbolic
imagery. Showing of overt action would make for more
straightforward prosecutions so that courts and juries would not
have to undertake exhaustive investigations into the meanings of
particular religious doctrines or face difficult questions requiring
expert testimony of religious terminology.
In light of the free and open society in which we live and the
eminence accorded religious speech in our constitutional
framework, it may be politically wise to require overt action in
seditious conspiracy cases to allay fears concerning the
prosecution of a particular religion or particular religious
speech.67 In the Rahman case fears that Islam was being placed
on trial would likely have been greater had the prosecution not
provided evidence of a massive terrorist plot, including evidence
of the defendants being caught red-handed mixing explosives to
be used in bombings. In order to strengthen a case against
clerics based on radical sermons evidence of relevant overt acts
should be introduced consistent with the character of the
seditious plot so as to convince the jury that the conspiracy in
fact posed imminent danger to the nation.
The "Clear and Present Danger"and "Imminent Lawless Action"
Standards in the Prosecution of Seditious Conspiracy
Criticism of government is thought to be the bedrock of our
66 Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810, 813 (2d Cir. 1962).
67 See Mae M. Cheng, Verdict Stirs Fears: Muslims in Queens Wary of Hysteria,
NEWSDAY, Oct 2, 1995, at A14 (discussing verdict convicting Rahman of waging war of
terrorism).
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democracy, and therefore seditious conspiracy cases elicit serious
constitutional concerns. As mentioned above, the seditious
conspiracy statute gives no criteria for determining at what point
colloquy between two or more people loses First Amendment
protection and constitutes a conspiracy under the statute. That
has been left for the courts to decide. The standard for analyzing
the content of speech in seditious conspiracy cases has evolved
over the years. The first modern day analysis was formulated by
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, in Schenck v. United
States,68 a sedition case from World War I, in which the Court
held that the constitutional guaranty of free speech and press
does not prevail where "the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent."69 That case involved
speech alone as a means by which to accomplish sedition in time
of war; the "substantive evils" about which Justice Holmes was
speaking were inducement of insubordination in the armed forces
of the United States and obstruction of enlistment while the
country was at war. Since Schenck, the Court has generally
adhered to the "clear and present danger" test with the focus
being primarily on its proper application. 70
In Abrams v. United States,71 the defendants were convicted of
seditious conspiracy under the Espionage Act of 1917 and 191872
with evidence that by today's standards may seem relatively
innocuous. The defendants were accused of circulating a printed
flyer in which they denounced President Wilson as a hypocrite
and a coward because troops were sent into Russia. The most
inflammatory section of the flyer assailed the government with
these words: "The Russian Revolution cries: Workers of the
World! Awake! Rise! Put down your enemy and mine! Yes!
68 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
69 Id. at 51.
70 See Abrams v. United States, 205 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(expressing his disapproval of Court's application of "clear and present danger" standard
and arguing that majority incorrectly applied the test in that there was no adequate
showing of imminent threat to national security arising out of defendant's speech); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
affirming conviction without adequate proof of immediate danger to government).
71 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
72 Id. at 616-17 (stating defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate provisions
of Espionage Act of Congress).
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friends, there is only one enemy of the workers of the world and
that is CAPITALISM... Awake! Awake, you Workers of the
World!"73
Another flyer contained the following statements:
Do not let the Government scare you will [sic] their wild
punishment in prisons, hanging and shooting. We must not
and will not betray the splendid fighters of Russia. Workers,
up to fight...
We, the toilers of America, who believe in real liberty, shall
pledge ourselves, in case the United States will participate in
that bloody conspiracy against Russia, to create so great a
disturbance that the autocrats of America shall be compelled
to keep their armies at home, and not be able to spare any
for Russia...
If they will use arms against the Russian people to enforce
their standard of order, so will we use arms, and they shall
never see the ruin of the Russian Revolution.74
The Court took this language to be a clear appeal to the
"workers" of this country to arise and put down by force the
government of the United States. 75 The Court held, in evaluating
the overall force of these writings:
This is not an attempt to bring about a change of
administration by candid discussion, for no matter what may
have incited the outbreak on the part of the defendant
anarchists, the manifest purpose of such a publication was to
create an attempt to defeat the war plans of the Government
of the United States, by bringing upon the country the
paralysis of a general strike, thereby arresting the
production of all munitions and other things essential to the
conduct of the war . . . [T]he plain purpose of their
propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war,
disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in
this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible
73 Id. at 620 (articulating anti-capitalist viewpoint in propaganda).
74 Id. at 622-23 (emphasis added) (identifying additional material distributed by anti-
Wilson supporters).
75 See id. (highlighting intended result of such material upon those who read
material).
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defeating the military plans of the Government .... 76
In a dissent objecting to the majority's application of the "clear
and present danger" test under these facts, Justice Holmes, said,
"Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a
silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present
any immediate danger that its opinions would undermine the
success of the government arms or have any appreciable
tendency to do so."77
The "clear and present danger test" is satisfied without any
overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy based on the notion that
preventing the spread of dangerous speech may be essential to
national security. As Chief Justice Vinson said in Dennis v.
United States, the Government need not hold its hand:
Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the
Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about
to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is
awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its
overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to
commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the
leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the
Government is required.78
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court laid down a substantially
similar rule, which, as noted by Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion in that case, is an offspring of the "clear and present
danger" test.79 The Court construed an Ohio statute, which
purported to make criminal the act of associating with a group to
advocate violence to achieve political reform. The Court held
that prosecution for subversive advocacy of violence or joining
with others to do so can pass constitutional muster only if such
"advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."80 There are
76 Id. (explaining underlying purpose behind circulation).
77 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(expressing view that published statements alone would not give rise to punishable
action).
78 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (emphasis added) (upholding
conviction for advocating overthrow of government before any overt acts were undertaken
in furtherance of goal).
79 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 453 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting
this decision represents advancement of prior rationale used by Court).
80 Id. at 447.
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two elements here with respect to prosecutions for subversive
advocacy: one, that such advocacy is directed towards "imminent
lawless action," and, two, that it is likely to result in "imminent
lawless action." This case makes it clear that the First
Amendment protects advocacy of violence in the abstract, but
that the Government may step in where the speech is an attempt
to incite people to undertake imminent lawless action and is
likely to produce imminent lawless action. The imminence test
still leaves unanswered the question of how close in time the
inciting speech must be to the anticipated lawless action before
the offenders can be stopped and arrested.
Temporal Relationship Between Advocacy and Action
The "imminence" standard of Brandenberg did not override the
"clear and present danger" test, but was intended to clarify it.
Whether the utterance is likely to bring about a danger of
substantial evils sufficient to constitute a "clear and present
danger" that is temporally "imminent" seems to be a question of
proximity and degree. 81 There is no algorithm; this is not rocket
science. As recognized by the court in Bridges v. California,8 2 the
"clear and present danger" test is a working principle, and the
question of proximity and degree cannot be completely captured
in a formula, but the degree of imminence of the evil at issue
must be "extremely high before utterances can be punished."83
A seditious conspiracy advocating violent action to be taken at
some unspecified future time or uttered with the hope that it
may ultimately lead to violent revolution may simply count as
"abstract doctrine" rather than "advocacy of action," and
therefore is not enough to satisfy the "clear and present danger"
test.8 4  On the other hand, "language of incitement" is not
constitutionally protected "when the group is of sufficient size
and cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and
other circumstances are such as reasonably to justify
81 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding evidence sufficient to
connect defendants with mailing of circulars contrary to Espionage Act of 1917).
82 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
83 Id. at 263 (positing what emerges from "clear and present danger" doctrine).
84 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320-21 (1957) (distinguishing between
advocacy of teaching abstract doctrine and advocacy of action).
218 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL CO'MENTARY
apprehension that action will occur."8 5 Thus, where facts involve
a "highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members
subject to call when the leaders ... felt that the time had come
for action, coupled with ... world conditions," the existence of a
conspiracy may have advanced sufficiently so that the
Government need not wait until some further "catalyst" is added
to the equation.8 6
Seditious conspiracy might be directed to action either now or
in the future in order to be sufficiently "imminent" as to permit a
Government response. Proof of an overt act will more clearly
show that the "imminence" test is satisfied under Brandenberg,
because an overt act helps to show that the defendant's call for
violent action is temporally close enough in time to make it
"imminent," rather than being so remote from action as to be
lacking in probative value.
Temporal proximity of the danger also depends on the political
state of affairs. In Schenck, Justice Holmes stated, "[w]hen a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace
are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right."87
Similarly, in American Communications Association. v.
Douds,88 the Court pointed out that the "clear and present
danger" test depends in its application upon the kind of danger
presented in the particular context. The Schenck case, involved
distribution of a circular denouncing conscription in impassioned
terms and vigorously urging peaceful opposition to the selective
draft, such as a petition for the repeal of the Selective Draft Act
of 1917. The most inciting sentence being, "You must do your
share to maintain, support and uphold the rights of the people of
this country."8 9 This was deemed to satisfy the "clear and
present danger test" under the circumstances of the day, but one
may well question whether that would be sustained under
similar circumstances in today's more tolerant society, even in an
85 Id. at 321.
86 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1951) (discussing how existence
of conspiracy creates danger).
87 Schenck v. Unites States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
88 American Communications Ass'n. v- Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
89 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51.
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era of heightened concern about terrorism.
The temporal relation between the language of incitement to
unlawful action and the time for action may be sufficiently
imminent if the appeal is described to be "as speedily as
circumstances will permit."90 In Bary v. United States,91 the
temporal relation is described as such:
It is enough if the indictment is directed with intended
precision to the taking of steps or the doing of things in
preliminary preparation for the employment of force and
violence in an effort to effectuate the overthrow or
destruction of the Government when the propitious moment
is at hand.92
In cases involving religious sermons, the particular
circumstances of delivery may be relevant. When a call to
overthrow the "infidel" government is delivered by an earnest
orator in a fiery manner to an impassioned, frenzied throng, the
question of "proximity and degree" of danger may well be
imminent, compared to a setting in which the delivery is
lukewarm and the audience docile. If the adherents of the
defendant's sect are an angry mob or in some other state of
agitation, that circumstance is relevant because they are more
amenable to be incited to undertake imminent lawless action.
PROSECUTION FOR RELIGIOUS SPEECH: A CASE STUDY OF SHEIK
OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN
As mentioned above, the Government indicted Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman and his nine co-defendants with various crimes,
including seditious conspiracy "to levy a war of urban terrorism
against the United States, to oppose by force the authority of the
United States, and by force to prevent, hinder and delay the
execution of the laws of the United States."93
A state of mind is sometimes difficult to prove, but in the
prosecution of Rahman and his co-defendants, evidence was
introduced as to the actual content of his sermons, specific
90 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 512.
91 Bary v. United States, 248 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1957).
92 Id. at 207.
93 United States v. Rahman, 854 F.Supp 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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counsel, as well as advice that was given to some of his followers.
The government based part of its case on evidence that Rahman
incited his followers to wage religious warfare against the United
States through the content of the Sheik's fervent sermons and
religious advice. The government endeavored to prove that the
Sheik's sermonizing and counseling incited his followers to wage
religious warfare.94
The central allegation of the seditious conspiracy portion of the
indictment was that the defendants conspired to wage a "war of
urban terrorism" against the United States, and to forcibly to
oppose its authority.95 The prosecution adduced evidence at trial
showing that Sheik Rahman was the leader of the seditious
conspiracy, the purpose of which was jihad in the sense of a
struggle against the enemies of Islam. As evidence of this
purpose, he had given a speech to his followers instructing them
to "do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades,
with the missile ... against God's enemies," and that the Koran
mandates this jihad96
According to his speeches and writings, Sheik Rahman
perceived the United States as the primary oppressor of Muslims
worldwide, given its efforts to assist Israel in gaining power in
the Middle East.97 According to Sheik Rahman, formation of a
fihad army made up of small "divisions" and "battalions" to carry
out this jihad was necessary in order to combat oppressors of
Islam, including the United States. In a January, 1993,
appearance at a conference in Brooklyn, New York, Sheik
Rahman voiced his beliefs in violent jihad. He stated, among
other things, "that being called terrorists was fine, so long as
they were terrorizing the enemies of Islam, the foremost of which
was the United States and its allies."9 8
One prosecutorial strategy in seditious conspiracy cases is to
introduce evidence of writings and speeches that alone do not
94 See Grinstein, supra note 22, at 1349 (commenting that government tried to prove
defendant encouraged followers to engage in religious warfare).
95 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating defendants
plan to wage "urban terrorism" on U.S.).
96 See id. at 104 (reviewing contents of Rahman's speech).
97 See id. (discussing Rahman's position that United States is foremost oppressor of
Muslims).
98 See id. at 107 (reviewing statements made by Rahman during January 1993
conference in Brooklyn).
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constitute sedition, but are relevant for the purpose of showing
motive and intent.99  In the Rahman case, evidence was
introduced of a press conference in which the cleric warned that
the United States would pay a terrible price for supporting
Mubarak, the President of Egypt.oo Although this evidence was
not seditious it was relevant to show the sheik's resentment and
hostility towards the United States motivated his solicitation and
procurement of illegal attacks against the United States.
Among the possessions seized from one defendant, the
Government found notebooks describing "war" on the enemies of
Islam and the manner of prosecuting them, including "exploding
... their high world buildings," as well as manuals on guerrilla
warfare tactics and explosives. 101
A handwritten notebook of, El Sayyid Nosair, another
defendant who was convicted of the murder 02 of Rabbi Meir
Kahane, a founder of the Jewish Defense League, stated that to
establish a Muslim state in the Muslim holy lands it would be
necessary:
99 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (holding that "[tihe First
Amendment ... does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements
of a crime or to prove motive or intent.").
100 See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 125 (discussing warning made by Rahman during June
17, 1993 press conference).
101 See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 105, 123 (describing contents of notebook found among
possessions of El Sayyid Nosair).
102 In the Rabman case, one defendant was charged under the RICO statute for the
murder of Rabbi Kahane. The RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §1959(a) states:
Whoever... for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing
position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, murders,.. . assaults with
a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, ... or
attempts... so to do, shall be punished ....
To be convicted of this crime, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the organization was a RICO enterprise; (2) that the enterprise was engaged
in racketeering activity as defined in RICO, (3) that the defendant in question had a
position in the enterprise, (4) that the defendant committed the alleged crime of
violence, and (5) that his general purpose in doing so was to maintain or increase his
position in the enterprise.
United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992).
In the RICO portion of the Government's case, Rahman and his followers were
characterized as the Jihad Organization, which it claimed was "opposed to nations,
governments, institutions and individuals that did not share the group's particular
radical interpretation of Islamic law," and that an objective of this group was "to carry
out, and conspire to carry out, acts of terrorism - including bombings, murders, and the
taking of hostages - against various governments and government officials, including the
United States government and its officials." Rahman, 189 F.3d at 126. Under the RICO
statute, the Government must prove that the defendant "committed his violent crime
because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or
that he committed it in furtherance of that membership." Co.ncepcion, 983 F.2d at 381.
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to break and destroy the morale of the enemies of Allah.
(And this is by means of destroying) (exploding) the
structure of their civilized pillars. Such as the tourist
infrastructure which they are proud of and their high world
buildings which they are proud of and their statues which
they endear and the buildings in which they gather their
heads (leaders). 103
Evidence showed that Rahman counseled a co-defendant to
murder the President of Egypt and issued a fatwa, a religious
opinion on the holiness of an act calling for the murder.104
As mentioned above, the prosecution introduced into evidence
a number of overt actions taken by various defendants in
furtherance of their plot to show they had moved well beyond the
mere agreement stage. Evidence of overt action in furtherance of
the conspiracy included the fact that many of the defendants
participated in military training exercises, the purpose of which
was to train them to carry out jihad "operations."105 Evidence
also showed that several of the defendants "purchased fuel,
fertilizers, and timers, and actively sought to locate detonators. 106
They had begun construction of the explosives when they were
arrested."107 In addition to providing assistance to the bombing
of the World Trade Center in February 1993, they had:
recruited sufficient participants to carry out the plan;
contributed money to rent a safe house in which to build the
bombs; reconnoitered the potential targets of the bombs, by
driving through and videotaping the tunnels and discussing
the structure of the tunnels with an engineer; purchased, or
attempted to purchase, what they believed to be the
necessary components for the bombs, including actually
purchasing oil, fertilizer, timers, and barrels in which to mix
the explosives; attempted to find stolen cars in which to
carry the bombs; and obtained a submachine gun to assist in
carrying out the plan. 108
One of the more damaging statements used against the sheik
103 Raman, 189 F.3d at 105.
104 Id. at 123 (reviewing facts supporting sufficiency of evidence of Rahman's
conviction).
105 Id (using evidence that plot went past mere agreement to support jury finding).
106 Id. (explaining that defendants purchased materials used in making bombs).
107 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining
defendants began constructing bombs when arrested).
108 Id. at 129 (noting defendants were beyond mere preparation stage).
[Vol. 17:199
2003] ADVOCATING THE VOLENTOVERTHROWOF GOVERNMENT 223
was a tape in which he said,
The Koran makes it (terrorism) among the means to
perform jihad in the sake of Allah, which is to terrorize the
enemies of God and (who are) our enemies too .... We must
be terrorists and must terrorize the enemies of Islam and
frighten them and... disturb them.109
On a tape recording, one of the conspirators had laughed as he
spoke of his anticipation of commuters drowning. I 10
In a case of this kind, where the prosecution is initiated in
order to prevent the accomplishment of an illegal objective, clear
evidence is difficult to obtain, but much of the evidence in the
Rahman case came by way of a paid informant. I "'
"Sheik Rahman's role in the conspiracy was generally limited
to overall supervision and direction of the membership," issuing
fatwas to members of the group sanctioning proposed courses of
conduct, and advising others whether the acts would be in
furtherance of fihad112 Rahman argued on appeal that he had
limited contact with most of the other defendants, that he was
physically incapable, due to his blindness, of participating in the
"operational" aspects of the plots, and that there was little direct
evidence of his knowledge of many of the events in question.
Andrew McCarthy, one of the federal prosecutors on the case,
was quoted as saying: "'There is no difference between being the
engineer of a specific act and someone who is the spiritual and
ideological leader of the conspiracy'... 'What the evidence I
think sensibly shows is that there is an organisation for
terrorism in the United States."11 3
"On January 17, 1996, Judge Michael Mukasey gave Sheik
Rahman a life sentence for his role in the conspiracy.""14 The
109 Gail Appleson, Sheik Heard Endorsing Terrorism Against Foes, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at 25 (commenting on evidence used at trial to show Rahman's guilt).
110 See Neil MacFarquhar & Tim Golden, Family Legacy. Two Sons of Imprisoned
Sheik Took Up the Talban Cause, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 30, 2001, at Al (discussing Rahman's
conviction).
I I See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 106, 132 (noting Salem was FBI informant in Rahman
case).
112 Id. at 104 (outlining Rahman's responsibilities including supervision and
promulgation of religious opinions on holiness of acts).
13 See James C. McKinley, Jr., The Terror Conspiracy The Verdict. Mountains of
Evidence, but Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at B5 (quoting prosecutor
Andrew C. McCarthy).
114 See Grinstein, supra note 22, at 1349 (discussing Rahman's sentence).
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Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of all the defendants
and upheld the constitutionality of the seditious conspiracy
statute.115
In the appeal, Sheik Rahman argued that the use of his
religious speeches and writings as evidence of his participation in
the conspiracy violated his freedom of speech and of religion. The
court of appeals noted, not unexpectedly, that conspiracy by its
very nature is characteristically committed through speech, and
that that the conviction of Sheik Rahman for the sermons and
counseling he gave in his capacity as a Muslim cleric did not
infringe his First Amendment rights.
[O]ne is not immunized from prosecution for ... speech-
based offenses merely because one commits them through
the medium of political speech or religious preaching. Of
course, courts must be vigilant to insure that prosecutions
are not improperly based on the mere expression of
unpopular ideas. But if the evidence shows that the
speeches crossed the line into criminal solicitation,
procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to violate the
laws, the prosecution is permissible. 1' 6
The court of appeals found that Sheik Rahman's speeches and
counseling of others as being ". . . not simply the expression of
ideas," but rather his speeches and counseling constituted the
crime of conspiracy to wage war on the United States in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §2384. For instance, he was quoted as saying to a
co-conspirator in response to a question about the propriety of
bombing the United Nations Headquarters: "Yes, it's a must, it's
a duty." 117
Sheik Rahman later advised a co-defendant "against making
the United Nations a bombing target because that would be bad
for Muslims, and advised him instead to seek a different target
(U.S. military installations) for bombings, and to plan for them
carefully." 18 The court went on to say:
Words of this nature-ones that instruct, solicit, or persuade
115 See Rabman, 189 F.3d at 88 (noting court upheld seditious conspiracy statute as
well as defendant's conviction).
116 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing
protected speech from criminal solicitation).
117 Id. (discussing Rahman's criminal solicitation).
118 Id. at 124 (outlining Rahman's advice not to attack U.N. but to seek U.S. targets).
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others to commit crimes of violence-violate the law and may
be properly prosecuted regardless of whether they are
uttered in private, or in a public speech, or in administering
the duties of a religious ministry. The fact that [Rahman's]
speech or conduct was "religious" does not immunize him
from prosecution under generally-applicable criminal
statutes. 119
The Court of Appeals ruled that Sheik Rahman's sermons
instructing his impassioned followers to wage violent jihad
against the United States met the "clear and present danger" test
in the context of the plot uncovered by the FBI, and created an
imminent danger to the nation's security. The ruling pointed out
that the buildings and tunnels that were the target of the plot
were pinpointed to disable major commercial activity of the
United States. The court felt that this was a sufficient basis for a
conviction of seditious conspiracy even though the tunnels and
targeted buildings were not, properly speaking, "property of the
United States." under Section 2384.120 The totality of the
conspiracy was deemed, as a whole to be an effort to overthrow or
destroy the Government of the United States by force. According
to this ruling, conviction of seditious conspiracy does not require
a plot designed to put down government buildings per se, but
may apply to a conspiracy that aspires to disable commercial
activity.
The appellants also argued that a conviction for seditious
conspiracy has to satisfy the requirements of the Treason Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, Art. III, §3, which provides in relevant
part: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort. No person shall be convicted of
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." The argument was
that the defendants were being tried for all the elements of
treason, but under a different name, and without conforming to
the two-witness requirement of the Treason Clause in support of
119 Id. at 117 (explaining Rahman's speech is criminal and gains no protection from
religious overtones).
120 Id. at 127 (citing United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1989)
(noting that although targets were not "property of the United States" it was a sufficient
basis for conviction).
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the same overt act.121
The Court of Appeals said that the Supreme Court had not
resolved the question of whether the Treason Clause applies to
offenses that include all the elements of treason but are not
charged as "treason."122  It is an open question "whether a
defendant who engaged in subversive conduct might be tried for
a crime involving all the elements of treason, but under a
different name and without the constitutional protection of the
Treason Clause ... ."123
The court further stated that the crime of seditious conspiracy
"differs significantly from treason, not only in name and
punishment, but also in definition."124 Mainly, the court believed
that seditious conspiracy "by levying war includes no
requirement that the defendant owe allegiance to the United
States, an element necessary to convict someone of treason"
under 18 U.S.C. §2381.125 However, I believe the Court of
Appeals misconstrued the treason statute. The statute reads as
follows, "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies
war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of
treason. . . " It is well settled that aliens, while domiciled in this
country, owe a local and temporary allegiance, which continues
during the period of their residence, in return for the protection
they receive, and that for a breach of this temporary allegiance
an alien may be punished for treason.
Perhaps a better disposition of this point would have been that
seditious conspiracy is a lesser included offense of treason, that it
is in the nature of "attempted" treason by conspiring to levy war
or to put down the Government. Also, treason is broader in its
reach, in that it applies to a defendant who owes allegiance to the
Government no matter where he is living, while the seditious
121 See Rahman, 189 F.3d at 113. Cf Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (suggesting,
in dictum, that citizens could be tried for offenses against the law of war that included all
the elements of treason), with Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (noting in
dictum that it did not "intimate that Congress could dispense with [the] two-witness rule
merely by giving the same offense [of treason] another name.").
122 See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining
Supreme Court did not decide whether Treason Clause applies to offenses that contain all
elements but are not charged as "treason").
123 Id
124 Id.
125 Id.
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conspiracy statute applies only to persons who commit the
offense in a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Sheik Rahman also contended that he was denied a fair trial
because the judge would not allow expert testimony to help the
jury understand his function as a religious cleric. The proffered
evidence would have provided general information about Islam
and would have adduced that Rahman's actions and statements
were governed by Islamic law.
The Court of Appeals held that the proffered testimony was not
relevant to the issues before the jury, and that the evidence
would not have constituted a defense that Sheik Rahman was
justified within a framework of Islamic law in conspiring to levy
war against the United States or to solicit others to commit
crimes of violence. The court of appeals held that the trial judge
also did not abuse his discretion in excluding expert testimony
concerning the concept of jihad. In any event, another defense
witness had provided testimony on the meaning of the term
"jihad."
It's a struggle. That's what the word jihad means, it means
struggle. It could take on another meaning for instance in
Afghanistan, Muslims fighting for their liberation against
the Russians. That's jihad also. But for us, in the context of
our environment, jihad is cleaning up our community of
drugs, getting our family, our men, strong, getting them jobs,
taking care of their family. That's a kind of jihad or struggle.
Another witness was permitted to testify as to the meaning of the
term "fatwa." The witness testified to the effect that a fatwa is
an opinion. When asked, "Are you commanded to follow that
opinion?" the witness responded, "No, he does not command us
anything. There is something I would like to know, and I ask
him what is right and what is wrong, and he would answer, and
it's all up to me what I see."1 26
The prosecution in seditious conspiracy cases must convince
the jury that the defendant's utterances issued a strong enough
warning to meet the "imminent lawless action" standard, and
often this is an area where the jury ought not be left with little
guidance. In a case involving religious speech, the jury must
invariably examine dogma of the defendant's religious beliefs and
126 Id.
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have the difficult task of deciding whether they are protected as
abstract teaching of principles, even if they teach "the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence," as distinguished from teachings deployed in "preparing
a group for violent action and steeling it to such action."127 That
is, juries must be able to determine whether the speeches or
passages presented into evidence call for some concrete action or
evoke mere spiritual metaphors. In other words, is the violence
spoken about merely symbolic-a literary device designed to
embellish the adherents' religious experience-or does the speech
call for war in terms that are objectively manifest?128
Judges who hear seditious conspiracy cases should allow
expert testimony on behalf of the accused for the purpose of
informing the jury about the development and dissemination of
the particular spiritual theory over time, the nature of the social
interaction between clerics and congregants, and of the
counseling and instruction of the accused, and to provide the
meanings of particular religious terms. That will help insure
that abstract principles and other metaphoric language might be
separated from doctrine that may truly pose a "clear and present
danger" to the Government.
For instance, a prosecution could be directed to one of the
prominent teachings of radical Islamic fundamentalism, namely
jihad. There is ample authority for the proposition that Muslims
take jihad to mean that it is incumbent upon them to seek to
expand Islam at the expense of the non-Islam world, or the "land
of war."129 Islamic philosophy has been asserted to mean that "it
is only right that the peaceful part of the world [i.e., the Islamic
world] should eventually come to increase at the expense of the
rest of the world. This is just, since it results in benefits not only
to Muslims but also to non-Muslims ... [who] benefit through
127 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
128 For instance the Koran states: "0 Prophet, strive against the disbelievers and the
hypocrites and press hard on them. Their abode is hell and an evil destination it is."
KORAN 9:73 (Muhammad Zafrulla Kahn trans., 1970.) Does the term "press hard" urge a
grisly death for all disbelievers, or does "press hard" simply describe disbelievers'
treatment in the afterlife? It is difficult to ascertain from the text alone the extent to
which this passage speaks in metaphor or just how the passage should be taken.
Extremists take passages like that to be a call for actual violence, calling upon the
believers themselves to inflict harm upon the target.
129 See OLIVER LEAMAN, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, 135 (1999).
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proximity to Islam and the opportunity to become Muslims!"130
"[I]t might well be thought to be acceptable to intervene
militarily to bring the truth more speedily before the minds of
unbelievers." 131
There are many warlike passages of the Koran that appear to
readily concur with the foregoing interpretation of Islam:
0 Prophet, struggle with the unbelievers and hypocrites, and
be harsh with them. Their refuge is Hell. (9:74)
Fight them until there is no persecution and the religion is
entirely God's. (8:40; see also 2:193)
If we had wanted, we would have raised up a warner in
every city. So do not obey the unbelievers, but struggle with
them powerfully. (25:34)
When you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks, then,
when you have killed a lot of them, take them prisoner.
When the war is over, you can set them free, either for
ransom or grace. If God had wished he would have avenged
himself against them. He may use them as a means of
testing you. Those who are killed in the way of God he will
not send awry. He will guide them and dispose their minds
correctly, and will admit them to Paradise, which he has
made known to them. (47:48)
Many religious authorities argue that jihad can be declared for
the killing of any polytheist enemies, including women and
children.132 The Sunnis sect of Islam claim that any relevant de
facto political authority can declare war, while for the Shi'i it
must be an iman, a divinely appointed leader.133 While the
importance of free will in religious matters is frequently
mentioned in the Koran, there is room to argue that toleration of
unbelievers is a threat to Islam, and that it "needs to be
challenged militarily in order to preserve the community." 34
Another area with which an expert witness could assist the
jury is whether the adherents of the sect themselves interpret
130 Id. at 135.
131 Id. at 136.
132 Id. at 138 (explaining jihad as it relates to killing of women and children).
133 Id. at 139.
134 Id. at 139 (commenting on who declares war in different Islamic sects).
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the sermons to be a call for actual violence that they are to
perform (as opposed to being performed by God or other deities).
If we trust the jury system, then we will have to trust that the
jury is positioned to weed out beliefs that are truly "dangerous"
from "innocent" beliefs that may pass muster rather than be
swept away in the national-security interest. But the jury may
well need the guidance of expert testimony from the defense as
well as from the prosecution.
There is no doubt that the government has the power to punish
seditious conspiracy, whether couched in spiritual sermons or by
a more explicit terrorist plot. The Court of Appeals, in affirming
the convictions of Sheik Rahman and his followers, acknowledged
that charges of seditious conspiracy "must be scrutinized with
care to assure that the threat of prosecution will not deter
expression of unpopular viewpoints by persons ideologically
opposed to the government." 35  It appears that Rahman's
conviction stands on solid First Amendment grounds. 136 The
arguments that religious speech should be treated differently
than other speech failed to garner any judicial sympathy:
"[S]peech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is the
very vehicle of the crime itself."137
The seditious conspiracy statute can be used to proscribe or
limit religious unorthodoxy, and to literally target certain
heretical or unorthodox religious doctrines. Congress has
apparently never enacted any law to specifically proscribe
unorthodox religions, but in effect that is what the statute
allows.138 That is, the government is permitted to regulate to the
point of effectively outlawing the doctrines of organized religions,
if the "clear and present danger" test is met.
THE SMITH ACT
The companion statute to the seditious conspiracy law is the
135 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir. 1999).
136 See Grinstein, supra note 22, at 1365 (positing Rahman was convicted based upon
First Amendment).
137 See United States v. Rahman, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July
22, 1994 (pretrial ruling denying motion to dismiss) (quoting United States v. Varani, 435
F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) which denied motion to dismiss during a pretrial ruling).
138 See Grinstein, supra note 22, at 1366 (explaining statutes restriction on
unorthodox religions).
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Smith Act,13 9 which makes it a crime to knowingly or willfully
advocate or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing the Government of the United States, or of any
state or political subdivision, by force or violence; to publish or
distribute any material advocating such action, if done with
intent to overthrow the government; or to be a member of, or to
organize, any group which has as its purpose the overthrow of
the government, knowing the purposes of the group. The Smith
Act differs from the seditious conspiracy statute in that it
pertains to the mere advocacy or teaching of concrete violent
action. Like seditious conspiracy, it has been interpreted to
apply only to concrete violent action as distinguished from the
teaching of abstract principles related to the forcible overthrow of
the Government. Seditious conspiracy pertains to plots directed
at overthrowing the government, while the Smith Act pertains to
the mere teaching or advocacy of the violent overthrow of
government. The seditious conspiracy statute is directed at a
conspiracy of two or more persons who plot to overthrow the
government by force, while the Smith Act's focus is on
organizations and members who teach or advocate the violent
overthrow of government.
Sheik Rahman and his co-defendants were not charged under
the Smith Act, although prosecution for membership in a radical
religious sect that advocates the overthrow of government would
seem to be a prosecutorial option. The Smith Act states:
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or
teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying the government of the United
states or the government of any State ... the government of
any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by
the assassination of any officer of any such government; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction
of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues,
circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written
or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or
destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence, or attempts to do so; or
139 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1994).
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Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any
society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate,
or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member
of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of
persons, knowing the purposes thereof-is guilty of this
section. 140
The Smith Act also contains a conspiracy section:
If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named
in this section, each shall be fined under this title... and
shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or
any department or agency thereof, for the five years next
following his conviction. 141
The constitutionality of the Smith Act, enacted in 1940, was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States,142 in
the context of defendants who were charged with being
organizers of the Communist Party
as a society, group and assembly of persons who teach and
advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government
of the United States by force and violence, and ...
knowingly and willfully advocat[ing] and teach[ing] the duty
and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the
Government of the United States by force and violence.143
The Supreme Court also held in that case that the "clear and
present danger" test applies to any prosecution under the Smith
Act. 144 As discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court has
held that violation of the Smith Act is a specific intent crime, i.e.,
the statute "requires as an essential element of the crime proof of
the intent of those who are charged with its violation to
overthrow the Government by force and violence."] 45
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
143 341 U.S. at 561 n.1 (Jackson, J., concurring).
144 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 506, 512, 517 (explaining how standard of "clear and
present danger" applies to any analysis of Smith Act necessarily includes First
Amendment issue).
145 Id. at 499-500 (citation omitted)
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Separate Sections Under the Smith Act
The Smith Act contains three sections, with separate
categories of conduct that violate the statute: (1) The advocacy
clause makes it a crime to knowingly advocate or teach the
desirability or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the
Federal government or the government of any state or political
subdivision, by force or violence. There are two elements here:
(a) advocacy and (b) violence. (2) The publication clause makes it
a crime to publish, distribute, display, etc., printed material that
violates the advocacy clause. There are three elements here: (a)
publishing, printing, circulating, etc., (b) of material that
advocates the violent overthrow of government, and (c) the
defendant intends that such publishing, printing, or circulating
will have the intended result. (3) The membership clause makes
it a crime to organize or attempt to organize a group that teaches
the advocacy referred to in the advocacy clause, or to become a
member of such an organization, knowing the purposes thereof.
There are two elements here: (a) organizing or becoming a
member of an organization with the requisite intent or
knowledge, and (b) the organization advocates the violent
overthrow of government (i.e., the elements of the advocacy
clause are applied to the organization).
Advocacy Clause of Smith Act
Like the seditious conspiracy statute, the Smith Act is silent as
to where the line is drawn between protected speech and
prohibited speech. The Dennis case left the standard for
ascertaining what constitutes "advocacy" somewhat uncertain,
but this was clarified in Yates v. United States,146 reversing the
convictions of five of fourteen defendants accused of violating the
Smith Act based on their Communist Party advocacy. The Yates
court articulated the elements of the crime of advocating violent
overthrow this way: "[Tihose to whom the advocacy is addressed
must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than
merely to believe in something."147 Thus, a crime of advocacy
146 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 313-15 (1956) (discussing trial court's
jury instruction, with clarification of what "advocacy" is, and is not).
147 Id. at 324-25.
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under the Smith Act must consist of inciting present or future
violent acts.148
The Yates court also held that the advocacy clause requires
that a defendant have specific intent to accomplish the overthrow
of government. 4 9 The specific intent requirement means that
the defendant must advocate, preach or teach people to take
concrete action toward the violent overthrow of the government,
and to do so as soon as possible. 150 The advocacy must be
directed to action as distinguished from advocacy of abstract
doctrines in order to be punishable under the Act. That is, the
advocacy must be uttered with a specific intent to accomplish
such overthrow. In order to convict, the jury must find that the
advocacy, teaching or preaching of forcible overthrow was "of a
kind calculated to 'incite' persons to action for the forcible
overthrow of the Government."151 By contrast, "advocacy of
forcible overthrow as a mere abstract doctrine is within the free
speech protection of the First Amendment ... ."152 In other
words, "advocacy" is construed to mean "in a manner to incite."' 53
Thus, mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even the
necessity for resort to force and violence to overthrow the
government is not, in itself, a violation of the Smith Act unless it
is accompanied by substantial evidence of a call to violence.154
"[T]he mere abstract teaching... of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same
as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action."155 Furthermore, advocacy of forcible overthrow,
"divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end," even if
such advocacy is uttered with a specific intent to accomplish that
148 See id. at 326 (alluding to requirement that advocacy "incites" others to
affirmatively participate in violent overthrow of government).
149 See id at 320 (explaining requirement of specific intent).
150 See United States v. Kuzma, 249 F.2d 619, 621-22 (3d Cir. 1957) (comparing other
cases and their interpretations of what Smith Act requires with respect to specific intent).
151 Yates, 354 U.S. at 312.
152 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1956).
153 Id. at 319 n. 26 (quoting Representative John W. McCormack: "... Government
has a right to make it a crime for a person to use language specifically inciting to the
commission of illegal acts .... [Ilt is advocacy in the manner to incite, knowingly to
advocate in a manner to incite to the overthrow of the Government ....").
154 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 319-20 (1961) (discussing difference
between teaching abstract doctrine and teaching "concrete action").
155 Id. at 297-98.
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purpose, is not enough.156
Smith Act offenses require rigorous standards of proof. That
is, charges of advocating or teaching of violent overthrow under
the Smith Act, "involving as they do subtler elements than are
present in most other crimes, call for strict standards in
assessing the adequacy of the proof needed to make out a case of
illegal advocacy."157 The type of evidence needed is (a) that there
was "advocacy of action" and (b) the organization was responsible
for such advocacy.15 8
The prosecution thus has the task of making a distinction
between advocacy as an abstract principle or academic discussion
from advocacy having the quality of incitement directed at
promoting concrete action to forcibly overthrow the government
by unlawful means. 159 Evidence to support the assertion that
there was "advocacy of action" within the constitutional
requirements of the Smith Act may consist of a showing that
leaders were instructing "particularly trustworthy" members "in
tasks which would be useful when the time for violent action
arrived."' 60 That is, when the group being given instruction are
"thought particularly trustworthy, dedicated, and suited for
violent tasks," a jury could find that the advocacy was done in a
manner to incite the violent overthrow of the government.161
In the Yates case, the type of evidence that was not deemed
sufficient to show illegal advocacy consisted of the following:
[T]he teaching of Marxism-Leninism and the connected use
of Marxist "classics" as textbooks; the official general
resolutions and pronouncements of the Party at past
conventions; dissemination of the Party's general literature,
including the standard outlines on Marxism; the Party's
history and organizational structure; the secrecy of meetings
and the clandestine nature of the Party generally;
statements by officials evidencing sympathy for and alliance
156 See Yates, 354 U.S. at 318 (holding Smith Act requires effort regardless of evil
intent).
157 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 232 (1961) (noting need for stricter
evidentiary standards).
158 Id. (describing type of evidence jury needs to convict).
159 See Yates, 354 U.S. at 318 (holding Smith Act does not prohibit abstract teaching).
160 Id. at 332.
161 id.(explaining when jury may find advocacy of action).
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with the U.S.S.R.162
However, such evidence, while insufficient in itself, "in the
context of other evidence, may be of value in showing illegal
advocacy."163
The kind of evidence that would be sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the advocacy clause of the Smith Act was
described by Yates and reiterated in Scales. Evidence of
meetings at which "the systematic teaching and advocacy of
illegal action" was taught would be probative.164 Evidence would
be relevant of meetings where:
[A] small group of members were not only taught that violent
revolution was inevitable, but ... were also taught
techniques for achieving that end. ... [M]embers were
directed to be prepared to convert a general strike into a
revolution and to deal with Negroes so as to prepare them
specifically for revolution. 165
Evidence sufficient for conviction might also be the fact that
the advocacy did not stop with teaching of the inevitability of
eventual revolution, but went on "to explain techniques, both
legal and illegal, to be employed in preparation for or in
connection with the revolution."166
Meetings at which there occurs the systematic teaching and
advocacy of illegal action could constitute a violation of the Act,
depending on whether there is a strong enough showing of
"advocacy of action." For instance, Yates discussed the following
situation:
It might be found that one of the purposes of such classes
was to develop in the members of the group a readiness to
engage at the crucial time, perhaps during war or during
attack upon the United States from without, in such
activities as sabotage and street fighting, in order to divert
and diffuse the resistance of the authorities and if possible to
162 Scales, 367 U.S. at 232.
163 Id. at 233.
164 See Yates, 354 U.S. at 331 (commenting on what was advocated at meetings).
165 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 233 (1961).
166 Id. at 232.
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seize local vantage points. 167
In Yates, one member was "surreptitiously indoctrinated in
methods ... of moving 'masses of people in time of crisis'".;
others were told to develop a special communication system
through a newspaper similar to Pravada. 168
Thus, there are two strands of evidence either of which is
sufficient to show illegal advocacy: "(a) the teaching of forceful
overthrow, accompanied by directions as to the type of illegal
action which must be taken when the time for the revolution is
reached; and (b) the teaching of forceful overthrow, accompanied
by a contemporary, though legal, course of conduct clearly
undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective the
later illegal activity which is advocated."169
Evidence should also be introduced as to the "doctrines,
organization, and tactical procedures" and policies of the
organization in order to furnish a background about the
organization's theory and terminology "which is crucial to the
proper appreciation of the tenor" of pronouncements made by the
organization.170  It is important for the jury to correctly
understand the "tenor" of pronouncements of the organization,
for certain statements, taken out of the larger context that is
shown by an analysis of the theory and terminology of the
organization, "might appear harmless and peaceable without in
reality being so."17 1 Testimony as to the theory and terminology
of the organization is also important to help the jury distinguish
between theoretical advocacy and advocacy of violence as a rule
of action. "[W]hen the teaching is carried out in a special
vocabulary, knowledge of that vocabulary is at least relevant to
an understanding of the quality and tenor of the teaching."172
Perhaps the most difficult prosecutorial hurdle of the Yates
decision is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be
167 Yates, 354 U.S. at 331.
168 Id. at 332 (finding general teaching of Communism as sufficient evidence in
proving illegal advocacy).
169 Scales, 367 U.S. at 234 (listing standards of evidence sufficient in showing illegal
advocacy).
170 Id. at 234-35 (noting additional evidence important in addition to two standards of
evidence in proving illegal advocacy).
171 Id. at 235 (explaining jury should be made aware of special vocabulary used in
advocacy teaching as necessary in determining whether advocacy of violence exists).
172 Id. at 233 (highlighting importance in comprehending special terms used in
advocacy teachings to grasp whether illegal advocacy is present).
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urged "to do something, either now or in the future, rather than
merely to believe in something."' 73  Thus, in a prosecution
involving religious speech advocating the violent overthrow of
government, the prosecution may be put to task to prove that a
cleric's speeches and sermons regarding jthad and calling for the
overthrow of "infidels" - meaning the United States and its allies
- were not given merely in the course of doctrinal disputation.
The prosecution must be able to show that the advocacy went
beyond mere metaphor or abstract doctrine and was directed to
advocacy of action.
Membership Clause of the Smith Act
The membership clause of the Smith Act174 makes it a felony to
organize or help or attempt to organize any organization or
assembly of persons which advocates the overthrow of the
government by force or violence, or to knowingly become a
member in such organization. There are two targets here: those
who organize and those who join the organization.
The language of the statute itself requires only that a member
have knowledge of the organization's illegal advocacy,175
however, the statute has been interpreted to require specific
intent to accomplish the aims of the organization.17 6  The
membership clause has been narrowly construed by the Supreme
Court to mean that in order to convict, the jury must find that:
the organization to which membership is ascribed is one that
advocates the "violent overthrow of the Government, in the
sense of present 'advocacy of action' to accomplish that end
as soon as circumstances were propitious; and ... [the
defendant] was an 'active member of the [organization], and
not merely 'a nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical'
member, with knowledge of the [organization's] illegal
advocacy and a specific intent to bring about violent
overthrow 'as speedily as circumstances would permit."'177
173 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 289, 325 (emphasis added) (finding trial court
did not accurately emphasize distinction between advocating action and thought).
174 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1994).
175 See id. (stating "knowing the purpose thereof' as sufficient in establishing guilt).
176 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221 (1961) (noting that membership
clause of Smith Act requires that accused have knowledge of organization's illegal
activity).
177 Id. at 220 (quoting with approval instructions given to jury).
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The Supreme Court explained the distinction between "active"
and "nominal" membership "is well understood in common
parlance... and the point at which one shades into the other is
something that goes not to the sufficiency of the statute, but to
the adequacy of the trial court's guidance to the jury by way of
instructions in a particular case."178 There must be the showing
that the defendant was an "active" member. According to the
Court, Congress could not have intended a purpose to punish
nominal membership, even if accompanied by "knowledge" and
"intent."179 Active membership accompanied by specific intent to
further the unlawful aims of the organization is required in order
to be punished under this statute.
The Court was concerned that some people might be active
members in sympathy with the aims of the organization, but not
personally intend to accomplish the aims, such as the revolution
or the violent overthrow of the government. Thus, it is important
to distinguish the element of specific intent. It is not enough to
show that the defendant had knowledge of the organization's
illegal activity and endorsed the aims of the organization.180 An
"active" member must be someone who does more than indicate
his approval of the enterprise and sympathy with its goals.
Someone can be an "active" member "without thereby necessarily
committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct
whatever.181 An "active" member might approve of the aims of
the organization, but personally intend to bring about only those
aims that are lawful.182 Also, a member may embrace the
organization's doctrines but intend to bring about those goals by
peaceable means, rather than violent or illegal means; thus
would lack the requisite specific intent to violate the Smith
Act.183 It must be shown that the member of the organization
178 Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
179 See id. at 222 (commenting that Congress did not intend to impose on passive
members the heavy penalties imposed by Smith Act).
180 See id. at 221-22 (remarking that specific intent is to be implied into "advocacy"
and "organizing" elements of Smith Act).
181 Id. at 228.
182 See Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1961) (indicating that
members under Smith Act must have personal views in order to satisfy "specific intent"
requirement).
183 See id. at 812 (explaining "If this [illegal intent] was not proved the conviction
cannot stand however strong the proof may be that he was an active and knowledgeable
member of an organization which advocated the violent overthrow of the Government.").
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has the requisite personal intent to bring about the violent
overthrow of the government as speedily as circumstances would
permit.18 4  The trier of fact must analyze the relationship
between the active member and the organization to find not only
that he knew of the unlawful purposes of the organization's
agenda, but also that it was his purpose to further the criminal
advocacy-that is, that the defendant had knowledge and intent
in addition to active membership.185 An active member, not
having the requisite specific intent, "may be foolish, deluded, or
perhaps merely optimistic, but he is not by this statute made a
criminal."186
During the McCarthy era, this provision of the Smith Act was
used to prosecute active members of the Communist Party, but
some prosecutions failed by not showing that the member
himself was primed for advocacy of action towards the end of
overthrowing the government. Mere presence at a meeting at
which someone else makes an incriminating statement
advocating the violent overthrow of the government is not likely
sufficient to show anything beyond the simple intent to be at the
meeting. On the other hand, that could be sufficient if the
context of the meeting indicated that this was a planning session
for future acts of revolution (e.g. where the people at the meeting
were preparing bombs, then a defendant would be hard-pressed
to argue that he only intended to be present at the meeting
without further intentions of involving himself in the plans).
That is, presence at a meeting at which either illegal advocacy of
revolution or the revolution itself was being plotted might
support an inference of intent to further the illegal advocacy
through violence. Evidence to fulfill the specific intent
requirement may be shown by a defendant's "significant action"
or "commitment to undertake such action."18 7 Circumstantial
evidence to adduce specific intent of an active member, according
to Scales, involves looking at such issues as "the nature of the
184 Id. at 811-12, 814 (holding that evidence was insufficient to meet burden because
mere urging to take action was not directly advocating overthrow of government).
185 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1961) (noting safeguard of due
process requires specific intent beyond being group member).
186 Id. at 229-30 (explaining statute requires more than mere "sympathy" for criminal
enterprise for conviction).
187 Id. at 228 (stressing Supreme Court's careful scrutiny devoted to constitutional
analysis of statute).
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organization, the occasions on which such advocacy took place,
the frequency of such occasions, and the position within the
group of the persons engaging in the advocacy."188 The Court
likened being a member of a group that engages in criminal
conduct to being a member of a large conspiracy.189 The trier of
fact must be able to distinguish legal political discussion from
that which is undeniably bent on illegal advocacy of the
incitement to violent acts.
The membership clause does not directly distinguish between
those holding leadership positions and ordinary members.190 But
knowledge and specific intent, for purposes of the membership
clause, can be shown against one who "actively and knowingly
works in the ranks of that organization, intending to contribute
to the success of those specifically illegal activities .... "191
It may be somewhat difficult for a jury to distinguish active
members in sympathy with the organization's agenda from active
members who have the requisite specific intent, for once a jury
determines that a member was "active" in an organization that
advocates the illegal overthrow of Government, particularly if he
occupies a leadership position in the organization, it is hard to
divorce that from the conclusion that he had committed himself
to further the purposes by action on his part, whether by means
of directing others, planning, or other such action.
When enacted in 1940, the Smith Act was patterned on state
anti-sedition laws directed against the Communist Party and the
leaders of the movement, and, as well, anarchists and
syndicalists.192  However, the Act clearly applies to any
organization that advocates the illegal overthrow of
government. 193
1s Id. at 226 n.18.
189 Id. (commenting that membership in conspiracy and membership in a criminal
group can be viewed as similar).
190 See Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298, 308 (1956) (holding that there is no proof
that Congress wished to treat members who hold organizational positions specially).
191 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961) (noting that member will be
no more immune from prosecution than group member who "carries out the substantive
criminal act").
192 Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298, 307 (1956) (interpreting legislative history of
Smith Act to equally encompass Communist-based organizations as well as anarchists
and syndicalists).
193 Representative John W. McCormack, one of the sponsors of the Smith Act, said in
the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives: "And by
the way, this bill is not alone aimed at Communists; this bill is aimed at anyone who
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The Term "organize" Under the Smith Act
The statute when originally enacted did not define what
Congress meant by "organize" with respect to those who
organize, help or attempt to organize any "society, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the
overthrow or destruction of any [government of the United
States] by force or violence .... "194 The definition of "organize"
was therefore left to the courts, and was specifically decided upon
by the Yates court, which narrowly construed the term
"organize." The Court held that this section of the Act was
directed solely "at the activities of those responsible for creating
a new organization of the proscribed type," and not "to reach
beyond this, that is, to embrace the activities of those concerned
with carrying on the affairs of an already existing
organization."195  Thus, "organize" was construed to mean
"establish," "found," or "bring into existence" the sense of the
formal founding, incorporation or chartering, and not to the
continuing process of internal realignment and recruitment of
additional members which goes on throughout the life of an
organization, or the formation of new units or "cells," regrouping
or expansion of existing cells. This was a big blow to the
Government, for the Yates court concluded that "since the
Communist Party came into being in 1945, and the indictment
was not returned until 1951, the three-year statute of limitations
had run on the 'organizing' charge, and required the withdrawal
of that part of the indictment from the jury's consideration."' 96
In 1962, in response to the Yates decision, Congress amended
the Smith Act to define the term "organize." The Senate Report
on the Amendment stated that
as a matter of common sense, the committee [i.e., the
Committee on the Judiciary] is of the opinion that the term
"organize was intended to mean a continuous process of
organizing groups and cells and of recruiting new members
advocates the overthrow of Government by violence and force." Hearing on H.R. 4313 and
HR. 6427 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong. 3 (1935) (cited in Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. at 307 n.8)
194 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1994). The quoted statutory language remains unchanged from
the statute as originally enacted.
195 Yates, 354 U.S. at 308.
196 Id. at 312.
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and not merely the original organization of the Communist
Party or some other party or society whose aims are inimical
to the security of the United States.197
The Committee cited with favor the definition of "organize" used
by the trial court that the Yates decision had reversed, to include
such things, "as the recruiting of new members and the forming
of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs,
classes, and other units of any society, party, group, or other
organization.' 98 The 1962 Amendment to the Smith Act has
remained unchanged, and states:
As used in this section, the terms "organizes" and "organize",
with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons,
include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new
units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs,
classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of
persons. 199
Modern Application of the Smith Act
Today, a prosecution under the Smith Act might be modeled
after the indictment charged in the Yates, by substituting for
"Communist Party" the name of a the targeted organization and
specific members, charging that the defendants (a) became
members and officers of the organization with knowledge of its
unlawful purposes, and assumed leadership in carrying out its
policies and activities; (b) caused to be organized units of the
organization in [Name of State] and elsewhere; (c) wrote and
published the [Name of Publication or Circular] and other
organs, articles on the proscribed advocacy and teaching; (d)
conducted schools for the indoctrination of the organization's
members in such advocacy and teaching, and (e) recruited new
members, particularly from among persons employed in the key
industries of the nation.200
The Yates indictment also alleged a number of overt acts in
197 S. REP. No. 1410 (1962), accompanyingH.R. Doc. No. 3247, at 1709-10 (1962).
198 Id.
199 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1994).
200 See Yates, 354 U.S. at 301-02 (noting the indictment charges for defendants and
co-conspirators in carrying out the conspiracy).
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furtherance of the conspiracy.2 01 However, under the Smith Act,
as is the case with seditious conspiracy as discussed above, there
need not be any overt act charged in the indictment. "The
function of the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution is simply to
manifest 'that the conspiracy is at work,' . . . and is neither a
project still resting solely in the minds of the conspirators nor a
fully completed operation no longer in existence."202  The
substantive offense in a violation of the Smith Act or in seditious
conspiracy is speech and speech itself rather than a specific act.
CONCLUSION
There is a limit to the inviolability of religious freedom. While
the Government may never be able to take away a person's inner
thoughts and beliefs about his or her religious views, the
Government can stop an individual or group from acting on those
ideas if the "clear and present danger" test is met. In Rahman
the prosecution showed that the FBI had exposed a massive
terrorist plot on the verge of completion, where the defendants
actually had begun to mix the explosives to be used in the
bombing.
Because terrorism has become the top national security
concern, trials like that of Sheik Rahman and his followers could
occur with increasing frequency in the United States should
terrorist plots be uncovered within religious extremist groups.
The breadth and severity of the seditious conspiracy statute and
the Smith Act make them logical tools to constrain terrorist
plots. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the question remains whether the government will use these
laws to stop less "subversive" preachers than Sheik Rahman. As
long as a jury can be convinced that some religious utterances or
tenets pose a danger to the nation, the government can succeed
in suppressing the doctrines. Will such a move impair religious
freedom more than it would protect national security? Will such
prosecutions have the effect not only of regulating the content of
religious teachings but also of censoring the sermons of peaceful
religious leaders? Will use of these laws have the effect of
201 See id. at 302 (explaining what defendants would do to carry out conspiracy).
202 See id. at 334 (noting that overt act need not be criminal in character) (quoting
Carlson v. United States, 187 F.2d 366, 370 (1951)).
[Vol. 17:199
2003] ADVOCATING THE VIOLENTOVERTHROWOF GOVERNMENT 245
essentially outlawing certain beliefs altogether?
There are fundamental problems inherent in speech conspiracy
charges, and this area of criminal law is peculiarly adapted to
political and societal circumstances. Justice Holmes, who first
articulated the constitutional parameters for prosecution of
sedition, said that the power of the government to prosecute
"undoubtedly is greater in time of war than in time of peace
because war opens dangers that do not exist at other times."203
In a period characterized by excessive fear of subversion, such as
during World War I, prosecution for speech conspiracy was
robust, as was the case during the McCarthy era, while during
times of peace seditious conspiracy and the Smith Act are
relegated to a kind of legal limbo.
One may want to keep in mind the words of Justice Black, in
his dissent in the Yates case, saying: "When the propriety of
obnoxious or unorthodox views about government is in reality
made the crucial issue, as it must be in cases of this kind,
prejudice makes conviction inevitable except in the rarest of
circumstances."204  Also, one must recognize how easily "clear
and present danger" can be manipulated to crush what Brandeis
called "[t]he fundamental right of free men to strive for better
conditions through new legislation and new institutions .... " by
argument and discourse, even in time of war.205
Under the Smith Act and the seditious conspiracy law, the
government has enormous power to attack religious beliefs. The
threat of terrorism may inspire prosecutors to start taking a
more aggressive stance toward "radical" faiths-a move that
could well be consistent with the purposes and intent of these
statutes, but fundamental freedom requires that great caution be
employed in distinguishing between religious groups that truly
threaten the nation from those that in fact might be less
dangerous and less vocal than was Sheik Rahman..
203 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(explaining situation where speech imposes clear and imminent danger allowing it to be
constitutionally prevented); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(stating "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured. .... ").
204 Yates, 354 U.S. at 339 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205 See Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920) (referring to securing
freedom through argument to fellow citizens).

